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Finite horizons: the American family
MARGARET F. BRINIG
School of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, VA, USA
1. Introduction
In the summer of 1992, while I was reading and thinking about Martha
Minow's latest book,' I was struck with my double role as a responsible adult.2
Vacationing in the north woods of Wisconsin with my mother, I suddenly
needed to care for her as well as my own small children. Generational con-
nections, important before, swelled hugely in crisis. As I caught my breath
between hospital runs and kids' activities, I was thankful that I had received
so much from my parents during my childhood. And I resolved to rethink
the relationships between parents and children, adults and elderly.
Policy makers wonder why American children do not outshine their foreign
counterparts on standardized tests and other measures of intellectual achieve-
ment.3 In a seemingly unrelated context, they ask why fathers systematically
fail to meet their child support obligations 4 and why an "epidemic" of reported
1 Making All the Difference (1991). Minow's provocative essay addresses the marginalization
of various groups including children and suggests that each group has a positive contribution
to make.
2 1 am obviously not the only middle aged person in that position. See, e.g., Herbert S. Donow
(1991) Am I My Father's Keeper? Sons as Caregivers, Gerontologist 31: 709; Marshall B.
Kapp (1992) Elder Law: Who's the Parent Here? The Family's Impact on the Autonomy of Older
Persons, Emory L.J. 41: 773, 775-776 (citing Subcommittee on Human Services of the Select
Comm. on Aging, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., Exploding the Myths: Caregiving in America (Comm.
Print 19233); Beverly Horsbaugh (1992) Redefining the Family: Recognizing the Altruistic
Caregiver and the Importance of Relational Needs, U. Mich. J. L. Reform. 25: 423; and Christine
L. Himes (1992) Future Caregivers: Projected Family Structures of Older Persons, J. Gerontology:
Soc. Sci. 47: 17.
3 See, e.g., The National Education Goals Panel (1992) The National Education Goals Report:
Building a Nation of Learners, 36 (suggesting that parents and children do not stress the impor-
tance of mathematics and science, although it is essential for global competitiveness); Final Report
of the National Commission on Children (1991) Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda
for Children and Families, xxv ("Despite more than a decade of education reform, America
remains a "nation at risk." American students continue to lag behind their counterparts in many
developed and developing nations in standardized measures of reading, math, and science"; Harold
W. Stevenson and James W. Stigler (1990) The Learning Gap: Why Our Schools Are Failing
and What We Can Learn from Japanese and Chinese Education, 44, 50-51.
4 See, e.g., Subcommittee on Human Resources of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.
House of Representatives, Child Support Enforcement Report Card (1991); National Commission
on Children, supra note 4, at 93; Taylor, Life without Father, Washington Post, June 7, 1992,
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child abuse exists. 5 If children are a good, perhaps the most important product
of a marriage6 and certainly the nation's greatest capital asset,7 why don't we
invest in them?
This paper argues that as adults we do not put our resources into children
because we have lost one important benefit of our bargain. We cannot count
on our progeny for support when we are no longer income-producers. 8 If we
look upon the historical family as an intergenerational relational contract,
Western society has cut off a vital link. The break in the chain occurred when
society prescribed that private family-based care of the elderly would be the
exception rather than the rule. In doing this, in contrast to non-occidental
societies, we have lost at least two valuable things. We have weakened the
incentives for investment in children and we no longer enjoy the many valuable
benefits that would otherwise come from senior citizens. 9
at C1; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, P-60 #173, Child Support
and Alimony: 1989 1 (only 69% of the total child support due was paid in 1989); Harry Krauss
(1990) Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, in
Stephen Sugarman and Herma Hill Kay (eds.) Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, 166, 169-174;
The 10 Most Wanted ... Fathers, Washington Post A12, August 28, 1989.
In several cases, a father has unsuccessfully that he had no duty to be responsible for his child
because he offered to pay for the mother's abortion. See, e.g., People ex rel. S.P.B., 651 P.2d
1213 (Colo. 1982); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223 (Wash. App. 1984); Harris v. State,
356 So. 623 (Ala. 1978); Ince v. Bates, 558 P.2d 1253 (Or. App. 1977).
5 National Commission on Children, supra note 4, at xxx; International Society for Prevention
of Child Abuse and Neglect (1992) World Perspectives on Child Abuse: An International Resource
Book, iii.
6 This is Gary Becker's claim. Gary Becker (1981) Treatise on the Family. See also Martin
Zelder (1993) Inefficient Divorces, J. Leg. Stud. 22: 503.
7 See National Commission on Children, supra note 4, Chapter 13 ("Investing in America's
Future"): "We must develop a common focus and purpose to change the conditions that jeop-
ardize the health and well-being of so many of our youngest citizens. Failure to act today will
only defer to the next generation the rising social, moral, and financial costs of our neglect.
We can and must be better masters of our nation's destiny." Id. at 390.
John H. Bishop (1989) Is the Test Score Decline Responsible for the Productivity Growth
Decline?, Am. Econ. Rev. 79: 178, suggests that the decline in American SAT scores may be
signaling a large drop in the quality of young entrants into the work force and that this may
be responsible for a $86 billion decrease in GNP in 1987 from what it would have been if the
1967 growth rate had continued.
8 Paul Rubin, James B. Kau and Edward F. Meeter (1972) Forms of Wealth and Parent-Offspring
Conflict, J. Social Biol. Struct. 2: 53, 54, argue that as more wealth is held in human capital,
rather than in other forms of capital, parents have less wealth to leave as an estate for children.
So long as wealth is accumulated in the form of real property, it will have a higher value to
children than its market value because of the children's specific skills. Id. at 57. This implies
that their control over children decreases. They therefore can't rely upon children for support
should they become indigent in old age. The authors suggest that this is why retirement plans
have replaced reliance on family for support for the aged. Id. at 55.
9 This is not a one-sided proposition, of course:
[P]eople live their lives embedded within various relationships, among which the family
for most of us is paramount. Since these relationships tend to grow stronger over time, they
take on added significance for most older persons. These relationships have an empowering
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These direct consequences also occasion byproducts. We have created a
situation where it is nearly inevitable that fathers will have less of a stake in
their children than do mothers."0 Further, in Western society, women neces-
sarily will have more of a stake in the care of aged parents as well as small
children."
quality contributing to the older person's potential for positive,affirmative autonomy to
think and act, as opposed to the simple, negative autonomy to be left alone.
Marshall Kapp (1992) Elder Law: Who's the Parent Here? Emory L.J. 41: 773, 782 (citing
Bertram J. Cobler (1983) Autonomy and Interdependence in the Family of Adulthood: A
Psychological Perspective, Gerontologist 23: 33).
One report suggests that the elderly have lost their utility and therefore their "worth." Lucia
C. Grassi (1988) Alternatives and Options for Financing Long Term Care, Nursing Homes 37:
22(7). This is reflected in the increase in "granny dumping" according to Dr. Robert Anzinger,
past president of the American College of Emergency Physicians, who estimates that between
100,000 and 200,000 elderly people are left on the doorsteps of hospitals each year. Barbara
Crosley (1992) How to Enjoy Your Elderly Parents, Focus on the Family 12 (Dec. 1992).
For example, in colonial Massachusetts parents were expected to play a role in the personal
lives even of grown children. John Demos (1981) A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in
Plymouth Colony, 103-104. However, as Gertrude Himmelfarb pointed out recently, this "Golden
Age" view of the family may not be realistic. In 18th and 19th century Britain, children were
viewed as savages needing "taming." Points of Light: New Approaches to Ending Welfare
Dependency (1991).
"a See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr. (1993) Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy at 5, 185-188;
Jerry McCant (1987) The Cultural Contradiction of Fathers as Non-Parents, Fam. L.Q. 21: 127.
This seems to be particularly true for black fathers. Black children are increasingly being raised
in matriarchal families headed by never married or divorced mothers. See, e.g., A World
Without Fathers: The Struggle to Save the Black Family, Newsweek, August 30, 1993, at 16,
17 (black children have only a one in five chance of growing up in a two-parent family until
age 16).
Over the last 60 years, despite increasing work force participation, there has been no real
change in the overall time mothers spend with their children. W. Keith Bryant (1992) Are We
Investing Less in the Next Generation? Historical Trends in Time Spent Caring for Children,
16-17 (mimeograph, Cornell University). See also John Robinson, Caring for Kids, American
Demographics 52 (July 1989), suggesting that mother and father spend similar time in primary
care for children. See also Elizabeth M. Dolan and Elizabeth Scannell (1987) Husbands' and
Wives' Household Work: Moving Towards Egalitarianism? J. Consumer Stud. and Home
Economics 11: 387, 398 (time spent is approximately the same, if overlapping time is consid-
ered). Work may influence the total amount of time parents spend with children, but impact
more in those aspects of the family life in which children are relatively peripheral, such as
homemaking or entertaining than in specifically child-oriented activities. Steven 1. Nock and Paul
William Kingston (1988) Time with Children: The Impact of Couples' Work-Time Commitments,
Social Forces 67(1): 59, 71. However, despite gender equality and involvement with the work
force, it is still primarily women who raise children. For example, Cynthia Rexroot and Constance
Sheehan (1987) Family Life Cycle and Spouses' Time in Housework, J. Marr. & Fam. 49:
737, 744 and Table 3, show a disparity of at least 2 to 1 between women's and men's partici-
pation in all childcare.
" Women are described as being sandwiched between two care-giving responsibilities. See,
e.g., Karen Czapanskiy (1991) Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, UCLA
L. Rev. 38: 1415 and popular press such as Newsweek. See, e.g., Melinda Beck, Trading Places,
Newsweek, July 16, 1990 at 48 ("The average American woman will spend 17 years raising
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Following this brief introduction, this article in Section 2 describes the
nuclear family as a relational contract with infinite horizons. Section 3 looks
at the same problem empirically, in terms of an American cross-sectional
analysis and a cross-cultural study with many of the same variables. Section
4 discusses these empirical results and provides some directions for further
study and some modest suggestions for change.
2. The family as an intergenerational contract
Many modem students of the family write in terms of marriage as contract.
However, virtually no one has thought of the parent-child relationship in this
way. 12 Regardless of its power as a theoretical construct, it is difficult to
speak in the language of bargain when any contract between a natural child
and his or her parents is clearly made without the child's express, or even tacit,
consent. 13 Even if one accepts the idea of an implied promise, other concep-
tual barriers remain. The difficulty is perhaps even more pronounced for
children and 18 years helping aged parents"); Nora Underwood, Mid-Life Panic; Thousands of
Canadians are Caught Between Children and Elderly Parents, Maclean's, August 19, 1991, p.
30 ("You have a situation now in which you have adults, particularly women, caring for their
children at a time when their own parents are likely to need help"); Lee Smith, What do We
Owe to the Elderly? Fortune, March 27, 1989, p. 55 ("Both Christianity and Judaism make
it plan that a child's responsibility to a parent is fundamental, maybe even greater than his
duty to his offspring . . .Carrying out the Fourth Commandment generally falls to middle-
aged daughters and other female relatives.")
12 Although the language of contract is not used, the lifecycle economic literature does imply
a contract-like relationship between the generations. See, e.g., Franco Modigliani (1988) The
Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Saving in the Accumulation of Wealth, J. Econ.
Persp. 2: 15.
Recent cases in which children sue their parents to terminate family relationships may be seen
as recission of the parent-child contract by the children. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Kingsley, 18
Fla. L. Week D1852, 1993 WL 31598 So.2d (Fla. 1993); Mays v. Twigg, 1993 WL 330624
(Fla. Cir. Ct.) No 88-4489-CA-01, August 18, 1993.
Sociologist Peter Laslett suggests an intergenerational tricontract connecting succeeding
generations, in which each cohort of children can claim support from parent cohorts as a matter
of right, creating corresponding duties to future generations. Peter Laslett (1992) Is There
a Generational Contract? in Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin (eds.) Justice Between Age
Groups and Generations, 24. This is different from the present analysis because it does
not also involve support to the elder generation. See also Derek Parfit (1991) Reasons and
Persons.
13 See, e.g., Richard Epstein (1989) Justice Across the Generations, Tex. L. Rev. 67: 1465:
"Democratic processes with universal suffrage cannot register the preferences of the unborn,
and the dialogue between generations is frustrated when future generations, or at least some future
generations, are of necessity silent." Epstein suggests a Rawlsian approach.
It may well be that the parents, in conceiving and choosing to bear the child to term,
covenant between themselves regarding parenthood. See, e.g., William Everett (1987) Contract
and Covenant in Human Community, Emory L.J. 36: 557.
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lawyers than for those in other disciplines, since infancy is a barrier to capacity
in most legal contexts.
4
In other fields, such as theology, anthropology, and economics, there is
no such built-in problem with thinking in multi-generational terms. Thus,
the sins of fathers may devolve upon their children. 5 Accepted wisdom dictates
that societies receive the customs and institutions of their ancestors.' 6 And,
most relevant for this discussion, important economic models are built
assuming implicit ties between parent and child.' 7
"4 Some of these disabilities include the inability to make contracts, commit crimes, consent
to marriage (also a contract), hold property, commit torts, give testimony, and consent for medical
procedures. See, e.g., Martha Minow, supra note 1, at 284; John Coons, Robert Mnookin and
Stephen Sugarman (1991) Puzzling over Children's Rights, B.Y.U. L. Rev. 307; Elizabeth Scott
(1992) Judgment and Reason in Adolescent Decisionmaking, Villanova L. Rev. 37: 1607; Allen
Susman (1977) The Rights of Young People: The Basic ACLU Guide to a Young Person's
Rights, 24-25, 48-49, 188-89; Sanford Katz, William Schroeder and Lawrence Sidman (1973)
Emancipating Our Children - Coming of Legal Age in America, Fam. L.Q. 7: 211.
IS Lamentations 5:7 ("Our fathers sinned, and are no more; and we bear their iniquities.")
16 See, e.g., John Rawls (1971) A Theory of Justice, 284-293 (intergenerational savings in which
each generation preserves the gains of culture and civilization necessary to maintain just insti-
tutions and adds to them for the benefit of future generations); Carl Schneider (1992) The
Channeling Function in Family Law, Hofstra L. Rev. 20: 495, 511 ("The knowledge that our fore-
bears organized their lives around the social institutions that still shape us and the belief that
the lives of our progeny will be made recognizable by their participation in those same institu-
tions add meaning to our lives and help inspire us as individuals and as members of society to
cherish the past and our elders and to nurture the future and our children.") See generally N.
Chodorow (1978) The Reproduction of Mothering. Mit Regan argues that once modern children
leave home, the extent of contact and degree of involvement tend to depend on the quality of
personal interaction rather than the expectations that flow from the parent-child relationship itself.
Regan, supra note 11, at 50, citing R. Bellah etal. (1985) Habits of the Heart, 89. In single earner
families, the father's attitude toward the fathering he received as a youngster will be the most
consistent predictor of the time spent with his children. Rosalind C. Barnett and Grace K.
Baruch (1987) Determinants of Fathers' Participation in Family Work, J. Marr. & Fam. 49:
29, 37.
7 Thus many macroeconomic models depend upon concern for future generations and past ones
to make sense of concepts such as "real wealth" and transfers under Social Security. Robert Barro
(1974) Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? J. Pol. Econ. 82: 1095, 1098; Paul Samuelson (1958)
An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or Without the Social Contrivance of Money,
J. Pol. Econ. 66: 467-82; Paul Diamond (1965) National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model,
Amer. Econ. Rev. 60: 1126-1150. Barro's Ricardian equivalence theory, in which government
purchases and martinal tax rates matter, but the debt/tax mix is irrelevant, has spawned a
large literature surveyed by John J. Seater (1993) Ricardian Equivalence, J. Econ. Litt. 31:
142. Seater concludes that although the theory is not completely true, its empirical success and
analytical simplicity make it an attractive model of government debt's effects on economic
activity. Id. at 184. Altruism within the family is in part built upon some expectation of future
inheritance from a parent. Gary Becker (1981) A Treatise on the Family, ch. 8; Richard Epstein
(1992) Justice Across the Generations, in Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin (eds.) Justice Between
Age Groups and Generations, 84, 89 ("The most powerful source of this interdependence is
genetic connection, which induces parents to take into account the utility of their children (and
the reverse as well) in making decisions about present and future consumption."); Donald
Burnheim, Andrei Shleifer, and Lawrence Summers (1985) The Strategic Bequest Motive, J. Pol.
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In premodern times, the language of contract would not have been out of
place. The change in terminology is not surprising, given the fact that Western
families have not had their current structure for all that long."8 When our parents
were children, elderly people frequently lived with their children's families.
In the days before Social Security, when no one had heard of pension plans,
IRAs or TIAA-CREF, children provided the security when parents could no
longer work. Granted, there were fewer octogenarians or nonagenarians 9 and
Econ. 93: 1045-1046; James M. Buchanan (1983) Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and
Laws of Succession, J. L. & Econ. 26: 71-85; Philippe Weil (1987) Love Thy Children:
Reflections on the Barro Debt Neutrality Theorem, J. Mon. Econ. 19: 377. These theories are
critically reviewed in Franco Modigliani, supra note 12. Modigliani's view is that the indi-
vidual seeks to consume all of his wealth during life, seeking to smooth consumption throughout
his lifetime. See, e.g., Franco Modigliani and Richard Brumberg (1954) Utility Analysis and
the Consumption Function; An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data, in K. Kurihara (ed.)
Postkeynesian Economics, 388; Franco Modigliani and Albert Ando (1957) Tests of the Life
Cycle Hypothesis of Savings: Comments and Suggestions, Bulletin of the Oxord Institute of
Statistics 99. The concept of human capital as an asset has been used to explain why some
countries experience acceleration of economic growth. Paul Romer (1986) Increasing Returns
and Long Run Growth, J. Pol. Econ. 94: 1002-1037.
In his 1992 Nobel address, The Economic Way of Thinking 23, Gary Becker presages some
of the argument of this paper when he states that "[i]f children are expected to help out in old
age - perhaps because of guilt or related motivations - even parents who are not very loving
would invest more in the children's human capital, and save less to provide for their own age."
He sets out a proof of this hypothesis in Section 3 of the Appendix, concluding following equation
14 that there will be "greater investment in children when parents expect greater old-age support"
from them. "Even completely selfish parents (a = 0) might invest in children if that would suf-
ficiently increase the expected old-age support from guilty children." This seems quite a change
of positions from that taken in his earlier Treatise on the Family, where he suggests that expen-
ditures on the elderly are part of a "social compact" between generations. In this work, taxes
on adults help finance efficient investments in children. In return, adults receive public pensions
and medical payments when old. Id. at 370. Public expenditures on the elderly were not impor-
tant until 1940. Id. at 371 and Table llS-I. Becker argues that "any generation that benefits
from the current level of public investments in children can easily use the higher earnings created
by these investments to provide current levels of support for the elderly, and sitll have a con-
siderable profit left over." Id. at 373. Children would thus be happy to enter into such a social
compact with their parents. This scheme necessitates a balanced budget to insulate the present
generations from heavy taxation in the future. See James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner
(1977) Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes.
'a See generally Mary Ann Glendon (1975) The New Family and the New Property; Viviana
Zelizer (1985) Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children; John
Demos (1974) The American Family in Past Time, American Scholar 43: 422; John Demos (1979)
Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in Tufte and Myerhoff (eds.), Changing Images
of the Family, 43.
'9 Life expectancy at birth in 1920 was 54.1 years. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics
1790-1970 B 116. In 1990, the expectation at birth is 75.4. United States Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstracts 1992 Table 104 at 76. The percentage
of the population over 85 was 0.2 in 1920 and 3.0 in 1990. Barbara Vobejda, Census: Elderly
Population Growth Will Lead to 4-Generation Families, Washington Post A3, Nov. 10, 1992.
Although these gains have occurred primarily through reduction of infant mortality (at the low
end), there has also been an extension of the expectancy of the elderly through eradication of
some diseases and advances in surgical technology. United States Department of Commerce,
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more children in most families to share the expense of housing and caring
for an aged parent. 20
Family law scholars have examined the difference in laws relating to child
custody and support as the role of children changed. They have concluded
that many of the legal perceptions of childhood postdate the change from an
agricultural to an industrial economy.2' In an agrarian economy, children over
the age of five were assets, since they could work around the farm or house-
hold.22As cottage industry and then factory production developed, the feeding,
clothing, and educating of children became more of a consumption activity
than a financial investment.23 The only positive input children could provide
Bureau of the Census (1993) Our Aging World II, International Population Reports P95/92-3
23-30.
20 The average size of a family in 1920 was 6. Historical Statistics, supra note 20, at A355.
In 1990, the figure was 3.18. Statistical Abstracts, supra note 20, at Table 66, p. 53 (1992).
See also Daniels (1985) Family Responsibility Initiatives and Justice Between Age Groups,
Law, Med. & Health Care 73: 153, 157 (twice as large in 1900).
2 Jamil Zainaldin (1979) The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody,
Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 C 1038; Katz eit al., supra note 15; Mary Ann Glendon
(1975) The New Family and the New Property; Philippe Aries (1962) Centuries of Childhood.
22 If not already generating a positive cash flow at this early age, they might well before reaching
the age at which they would set up an independent household. In fact, the noted historian Philippe
Aries has developed a "theory of childhood" as a separate age of man based upon the decline
in infant mortality. Children under age 5 up until perhaps 1700 were more likely to die than to
live, so parents did not dare become too attached to them. As soon as they passed infancy,
they were thought of as "miniature adults" who wore smaller adult-styled clothes and per-
formed increasingly adult-like tasks around the house. Aries, supra note 10.
The colonial family is described by Michael Grossberg as: "hierarchical, patriarchal, and
vested with overlapping and undifferentiated internal and external obligations. The community
charged each male governor with the duty of maintaining a well-governed home and sustained
his authority by granting him control of its inhabitants as well as of property and other resources."
Michael Grossberg (1985) Governing the Hearth, 5. See also John Demos, supra note 10,
at 100-101. However, the early colonies such as that of Massachusetts Bay were comprised mainly
of small nuclear families. Id. at 64-65. This apparently continued as late as 1975 in Rhode Island,
were a study found 82% of the families were nuclear. Edward T. Pryor, Jr. (1972) Rhode Island
Family Structure 1887-1960, in Peter Laslett (ed.) House and Family in Past Time, 571. Barbara
Laslett argues that the nuclear family pattern continued until the early 1970s. The Family as a
Public and Private Institution: An Historical Perspective, J. Marr. & Fam. 35: 480, 483 (1973).
23 John C. Caldwell (1982) Theory of Fertility Decline, contrasts the economic benefits of
children in poor, traditional rural societies with the high economic costs of children in rich,
Westernized industrialized societies. Gary Becker and H, Gregg Lewis (1973) On the Interaction
Between the Quantity and Quality of Children, J. Pol. Econ. 2: S279 state that the cost of
adding an additional child, holding quality of care constant, is greater the higher the quality is.
The English Poor laws (43 Eliz. c.2) enacted in 1601, provided that relatives were to be
the primary source of support for old people. Community provision was to be the last resort.
This was the essential legal position in England until 1950. David Thomson (1984) 'I Am Not
My Father's Keeper': Families and the Elderly in Nineteenth Century England, L. & Hist. Rev.
2: 265. William Blackstone wrote that parents, because they care for infants, "ought in return
to be supported by their offspring," who owe them "honor and reverence" regardless of misbe-
havior on the parents' part. I Commentaries on the Law of England, ch. 16. Thomson argues
that these rules may have been greatly circumscribed in reality. Thomson at 268-269.
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for the total family financial picture was their income,24 which theoretically
belonged to their parents. 25 And when, for whatever public interest or interest
group reason,26 child labor laws and compulsory education statutes were
enacted, 2 even the relatively small income that most children could provide
evaporated. 2 But the problem is larger than this. In some industrialized nations,
even though children are no longer needed as income producers during
minority, the attitude towards aged parents is quite different.29
The legal treatment of children in families has always presumed a lack of
anything approaching contract between them and their parents. Parents are
24 Zainaldin, supra note 22. See also John Kett (1975) Rites of Passage: Youth and Adolescence
in America, 1790-Present; Daniel Vickers (1988) Working the Fields in a Developing Economy:
Essex County, Massachusetts 1630-1675, in Stephen Innes (ed.) Work and Labor in Early
America, 49-69; Louis Green Carr and Lorena S. Walsh (1988) Economic Diversification and
Labor Organization in the Chesapeake, 1650-1820, in Stephen Innes (ed.) Work and Labor in
Early America 150-151, 167-168; David Stern, Sandra Smith and Fred Doolittle (1975) How
Children Used to Work, Law & Cont. Probs. 39: 93. For a modern case in which the father's
control over the family's "exchequer" or purse controlled intrafamilial tort immunity, see Wright
v. Wright, 213 Va. 177, 1919 S.E.2d 223 (1972).
25 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1965). This concept was used to explain
when children become emancipated as recently as World War II. See, e.g., Buxton v. Bishop,
185 Va. 1, 37 S.E.2d 744 (1946).
26 H.P. Marvell has suggested that the laws were enacted as protectionist legislation for unmar-
ried working men, whose factory wages were threatened since women and children would work
for less. Factory Regulation: A Reinterpretation of the Early English Experience, J.L. & Econ.
20: 379-409 (1977). See also Gary Anderson and Robert Tollison (1984) A Rent-Seeking
Explanation of the British Factory Acts, in D.C. Collander (ed.) Neoclassical Political Economy.
27 Compulsory education statutes were enacted in the 1860s. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972); child labor laws in the 1890-1910 period. Stern, Smith and Doolittle, supra note
25.
28 This of course does not include money traditionally earned by paper boys, baby-sitters, or
teen-aged lawn maintenance personnel. Most families in which such moneymaking goes on
are middle-class, and the children keep their earnings for themselves, although in most states
parents have a right to them. See, e.g., Buxton v. Bishop, 185 Va. 1, 37 S.E.2d 755 (1946); Wright
v. Wright, 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223 (1972).
Children of truly indigent parents are not included in this analysis either. In some of these
families, public assistance serves as the only form of household income. In others, older children
do in fact work outside the household and do provide needed income for family expenses.
29 Thus, my thesis is consistent with that offered by Paul Rubin, James Rau, and Edward Meeker,
supra note 9, who imply that parents who cannot count on threats (of removing bequests of
real property) to control their children will invest in the children's human capital. Even where
real property is not important as a wealth transmission mechanism, if aged parents are con-
nected to their adult children, there will be more investment in minor children.
Since this paper was written, I discovered the work done by Donald Cox and Odel Stark,
Intergenerational Transfers and the Demonstration Effect, presented at the Southern Economics
Association annual meeting in New Orleans, November 21-23, 1992. Cox and Stark begin
with parties whose identities and incentives are the same as those presented in this paper. They
argue, however, that causation works the other way. In their model, parents demonstrate what
they will expect from their children in the future as they interact with their own elderly parents
through phone calls and visits. Of course, the two phenomena are not mutually exclusive.
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strongly presumed to act in their children's best interest 0 and are legally
given almost all decision-making power when it comes to interactions with the
outside world. 3' Even within the family, relationships are treated as private and
agreements as unenforceable. 32 Thus, children cannot sue their parents for
simply being bad parents,33 nor for failure to provide the education or other
30 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson, 450'U.S. 398 (1981).
31 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 15. This is a power that has not changed since the time of
Blackstone, although in the 19th century the male head of household represented his wife as well.
He exercised suffrage, held the family property, and entered into contracts. William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 1: 433-436; Martha Minow, supra note 1, at 269-270.
32 The family was considered a private sphere in which the state would not interfere unless
called upon to do so by the parents. John Demos, supra note 10, at 100-101; Jana Singer (1992)
The Privatization of Family Law, Wis. L. Rev. 1445 ; James Schouler (1870) A Treatise on the
Law of Domestic Relations, 299; Martha Minow, supra note 1, at 270.
Recently, children have been given some autonomy in areas of personal privacy, such as
contraception and abortion, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); though the Supreme Court has upheld statutes giving parents of
immature pregnant minors the right to be informed in most cases of their daughter's preg-
nancy. H.L v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S., 112
S. Ct. 2791 (1992). As the child approaches majority, he or she may also acquire decision-making
power in terms of elective medical care; see, e.g., Ala. Code §22-2-4 (age 14); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§109.840 (age 15); S.C. Code Ann. §20-7-28 (La. Coop. 1985) (age 16); In Re Green, 448 Pa.
338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972); and child custody placement with divorcing parents. See, e.g., Va.
Code Ann. §20-107.2(7) (Michie Supp. 1993) ("The reasonable preference of the child, if the
court deems the child to be of reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and experience to
express such a preference"); Wis. Stat. § 767.24 (1985-86)(2)(am) ("The wishes of the child
as to his or her custody"); U.M.D.A. § 402(2) (wishes of the child as to his custodian); see
generally Ellen G. Garrison (1991) Children's Competence to Participate in Divorce Custody
Decisionmaking, J. Clinical Child Psychology 20: 79; see generally Joseph Kett (1986) Rites
of Passage: Adolescence in America; Scott, supra note 15, at 1608, writes: "By age fourteen
adolescents are indistinguishable from adults in their decision making competence." Children
over age seven are able to testify in most cases, and where criminal behavior directed at them
is involved, even younger children may be witnesses if they understand the difference between
right and wrong. See, e.g., Martha Minow, supra note 1, at 284. Minow notes, id. at 303, that
articulating children's interests in terms of rights undermines the relationships through which
their needs are usually met. See also Arlene Skolnick (1975) The Limits of Childhood:
Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, Law & Cont. Prob., 38, 43.
State statutes may also provide for emancipation prior to the age of majority. For a critical
discussion with some empirical evidence from California, see Carol Sanger and Eleana Willemsen
(1992) Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modem Times, U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 25: 239. The
statutes are collected id. at n. 25.
All of these movements towards independence of minors weaken the implicit contract we
discuss here. Together with outside care of aged parents, on margin they dilute the investment
the parents can make. Perhaps because I am a parent of teenagers, I am skeptical that the legal
changes are good.
3' Burnett v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978); see generally Comment, Defining
the Parent's Duty After Rejection of Parent-Child Immunity: Parental Liability for Emotional
Injury to Abandoned Children, Vand. L Rev. 33: 775 (1980). A recent much publicized case gave
at least one teen aged child the ability to "divorce" his parents. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 18 Fla.
L. Week D1857, 1993 W.L. 31598 (Fla. 1993). However, on appeal, the case was decided on
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amenities that the child feels appropriate. 34In other words, they cannot enforce
the implicit contracts we discuss here.
However appropriate a no-contract assumption may be in a legal sense, it
loses descriptive power when we analyze the family as an economic unit.
This problem is particularly evident when we consider the incentive struc-
ture within the family.35 Currently the incentive provided for investment in
children is purely subjective.36 Parents may "spend" time or money on their
the complaint by the foster parents for termination of parental rights and remanded for completion
of adoption proceedings.
If parents' behavior towards their children is truly outrageous, the state, rather than the
child, takes action to remove the children from the home, sometimes permanently. But there is
then no compensation that runs from parent to child, although the parent may have to reim-
burse the state for money expended on the child's behalf due to foster care. See, e.g., Va. Code
§16.1-290.
Some states have allowed the child's representative (usually the other parent) to bring suit
for outrageous intentional torts, see, e.g., Doe v. Holt, 332 N.C. 90, 418 S.E.2d 511 (1992); if
the family unit is effectively destroyed. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951)
("complete abandonment of the parental relation"). Most states currently allow suits in tort
(not contract) for simple negligence, especially in automobile accident cases. See, e.g., Smith
v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971). Household or automobile insurance usually
pays for such recoveries, thus relieving, rather than threatening, burdens upon the "household
exchequer." See, e.g., Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978).
3 In divorce cases, this is described as a problem of standing. The child does not have the
ability to enforce court-ordered support nor to ask for increased support to meet additional
expenses. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933), Kelleher v. Kelleher, 21 11. App.
3d 601, 316 N.E.2d 212 (1974); Drake v. Drake, 89 App. Div. 2d 207, 455 N.Y.S.2d 420
(1982). Once the child reaches the age of majority, an action for support may not be brought
by the parent, but may be entertained by the adult child or a representative under statutes requiring
support for incompetent or inform adult children. Harmatz v. Harmatz, 457 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1983);
Suire v. Miller, 363 So. 2d 945 (La. App. 1978).
35 The incentives provided to various parties is very important in the law and economics analysis
of other civil obligations, such as tort, Guido Calabresi (1961) The Costs of Accidents; William
Landes and Richard Posner (1988) The Economic structure of Tort Law, and George Priest (1982),
The Best Evidence of the Effect of Products Liability Law on the Accident Rate: A Reply,
Yale L.J. 91: 1386; George Priest (1991) The Modem Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Source;
and contract, see, e.g., William Bishop (1983) The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics
of Insurance, J. Leg. Stud. 12: 241; William Bishop (1985) The Choice of Remedy for Breach
of Contract, J. Leg. Stud. 14: 299; Lon Fuller and William Perdue (1936) The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), Yale L.J. 46: 52, 373; Steven Shavell (1984) The Design of
Contracts and Remedies for Breach, Q. J. Econ. 99: 121. Elsewhere I have extended this
analysis to the married couple. June Carbone and Margaret Brinig (1991) Rethinking Marriage:
Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, Tul. L. Rev. 65: 953; and Margaret
F. Brinig (1993) The Law and Economics of No-Fault Divorce, Fan. L.Q. 26: 453.
36 Martha Minow, supra note 1, at 284, notes that "over the past several centuries members
of Western societies, including parents, have valued children less for their economic contribu-
tions than as objects of love and affection." Katharine T. Bartlett (1988) Re-Expressing
Parenthood, Yale L.J. 98: 293, 298, suggests that parents earn authority by meeting support oblig-
ations. This is quite like the Hobbesian view, "[hie which giveth sustenance to another, whereby
to strengthen him, hath received a promise of obedience in consideration thereof." Thomas Hobbes
(1982) De Corpore Politico pt. II, ch. 4, §3, in Jeffrey Blustein, Parents and Children: The Ethics
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children because they are altruistic.37 They may invest in their children because
they feel some sort of duty to do so. 38 They may act because they take pride
in their children's achievements, either because these enhance the family
reputation or their own immortality.39 They do not act because they expect
any sort of reward, 4' especially not in a monetary sense.
Formerly in Western society, and currently in other places, parents have
another incentive for "optimal" investment in their offspring. Because adult
children will be expected to support their now infirm parents, such investments
have a financial as well as a psychic reward.4t In North America and Western
of the Family, 69. See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, Cardozo L. Rev. 14: 1747, 1818-1819, noting that parental
"authority is a corollary of stewardship - earned during gestation and childhood and exercised
in service to the child's emerging capacity." Like Samuelson and Barro in the economic context,
supra note 18, Woodhouse extends her duty of stewardship to another generation by arguing
that well brought up children will later nurture their own children. Compare C. Russell Hill
and Frank R. Stafford (1980) Parental Care of Children: Time Diary Estimates of Quantity,
Predictability and Variety, J. Hum. Res. XV: 2.
" This is not the sort of "pure" altruism that results in Good Samaritan behavior. See, e.g.,
Jane Mansbridge (1990) Beyond Self Interest. In economic terms, one is altruistic about another
when they have interdependent utility functions. Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy (1988) The
Family and the State, J. L. & Econ. 31: 1. The other is seen as an extension of the self. Gary
Becker, supra note xx, at 5. In more commonplace language, they love each other. Richard Posner
(1992) Sex and Reason; Allen Parkman (1992) No-Fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?, 26-27.
Martin Zelder, supra note 6, writes that since the public goods investment in children cannot
be divided at divorce, many "inefficient" divorces are granted, and many noncustodial parents
will perceive that dollars spent will go into the custodial parent's general "pot," with only a
fraction being spent on the children themselves. Id. at 506. Robert Weiss and Robert Willis suggest
that non-support by non custodial parents may be due largely to the fact that the non custodial
parent cannot monitor spending by a custodial parent he no longer completely trust to act in
the children's' best interest. Children as Collective Goods in Divorce Settlements, J. Lab. Econ.
1:15 (1985).
Fathers spend about 1.5 hours per week on direct child care when both parents work, as
compared to the mother's 4.4 hours. When only one parent works, the father spends 2.4 hours,
the mother 8.7. Peter Kooreman and Arie Kapteyn (1987) A Disaggregated Analysis of the
Allocation of Time Within the Household, J. Pol. Econ. 95: 223, 233. The wife's sole respon-
sibility for child care when employed was 39.2 percent of her time in 1976; when not employed
it was 55.8. Elizabeth Maret and Barbara Finlay (1984) The Distribution of Household Labor
Among Workers in Dual Earner Families, J. Marr. & Fan. 46: 357 (May).
38 The eighteenth century economist David Hume used this explanation as a justification for
treating adultery more seriously for married women than married men: men will have the oblig-
ation of supporting their offspring, and will not be inclined to take care of children without
the biological connection. Of Morals, Sec. XII in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary (rev.
ed. 1985).
39 Buchanan, supra note 18; Becker and Murphy, supra note 38.
' but see Parker v. Stage, 43 N.Y.2d 128, 371 N.E.2d 513, 400 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1977), sug-
gesting that the parent's duty of providing at least minimal support depends on at the child's
giving some credence to the parent's corresponding right to exert some control and discipline.
41 Oriental cultures also have religious and moral traditions of respect for the elderly that, despite
the Fourth Commandment to "honor thy father and thy mother," are largely missing from Western
culture.
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Europe, we expect our elderly parents to support themselves out of some
combination of accumulated earnings, pension plans, and social security.42
Unlike the non-Western industrialized nations,43 our elderly largely live alone
or in nursing homes. The next section of this paper explores the question of
whether there is a connection between treatment of elderly parents and invest-
ment in minor children.
3. Modeling the connections between generations
Reduced to its simplest non-mathematical terms, this paper argues that positive
investments in children will be a function of the parent's expectation of
reciprocal care in advanced age. Since families tend to mirror patterns
of care through the generations," individually and on an aggregate level,
the parent's current involvement with his or her own parents reflects these
expectations. Of course, the family expectations will not be the only thing
42 Karen C. Holder and Timothy M. Smeeding (1990) The Poor, the Rich, and the Insecure
Elderly Caught in Between, Millbank Q. 68(2): 191. Statutes in some states do require some
minimal support from working children if the aged and infirm parents would otherwise be on
state support or are in state institutions. See, e.g, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 20-47-106 (1992); Cal.
Civ. Code § 206 (1992); Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 31-2-9-1 (1992); Md. Fam. Law Code Ann.
§ 13-102 (1991); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-6-301 (1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 428.070 (1991);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 44:1-140 (West Supp. 1991); 62 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1973 (1968 & Supp.
1990); S.D. Cod. Laws § 25-5-21 (1992); Va. Code Ann. § 20-88 (Michie 1991); W. Va. Code
§ 9-5-9 (1990). See generally Terrance A. Kline (1992) A Rational Role for Filial Responsibility
Laws in Modem Society? Fam. L.Q. 26: 195, 200 & n.47 (1992); Catherine D. Byrd (1988)
Relative Responsibility Extended: Requirements of Adult Children to Pay for their Indigent
Parent's Medical Needs, Fam.LQ. 22: 87; Ranae R. Patrick (1984) Honor Thy Father and Mother:
Paying the Medical Bills of Elderly Parents, U. Rich. L. Rev. 19: 69; Alison P. Barnes and
Lawrence N. Frolick (1993) America The Aging, Fam. Advocate 16: 19, 22-23. Most elderly
are above the poverty line, but just barely. Holden and Sneeding, Table 10; Henry Cisneros (1989)
Health Policy for an Aging Population, Houston L. Rev. 26: 787 & fn. 19. These figures are
confirmed by statistics the author obtained on Oct. 2, 1992, from the United States Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Poverty and Statistics Branch, Poverty Statistics (for
1990).
43 See, e.g., Charles Y. Horioka, The Applicability of the Life Cycle Model of Saving to Japan
(8072), cited in Burnheim, Shleifer and Summers, supra note 18, at 1074. By looking at indus-
trialized nations, and by systematically factoring out the influence of agriculture in the empirical
estimates, the otherwise strong effect of economic incentives in the family farm has hopefully
been eliminated. My thanks go to Paul Rubin for this consideration.
" See, e.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo. 1982); Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Characteristics of Child Victims of Physical Violence: Research
Findings and Clinical Implications, J. Interpersonal Violence 7, 244-276 (June, 1992); Fong,
P. and Coles, R. (1991) Breaking the Cycle: Survivors of Child Abuse and Neglect;Starr, R.H.,
Jr., MacLean, D.C., and Keating, D.P. (1991) Life-Span Developmental Outcomes of Child
Maltreatment, in Starr, R.H., Jr. and Wolfe, D.A. (eds.) The Effects of Child Abuse and Neglect,
1-32; Zaidi, L.Y., Knutson, J.F.; Mehm, J.G. (1989) Transgenerational Patterns of Abusive
Parenting: Analog and Clinical Tests, Aggressive Behavior 15: 137-152.
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influencing investment, so this empirical work controls for other factors as
well.
More formally, if yi... Yn represent investment in children, x, represents
family care of the aged, and x2 .. x. represent other factors influencing invest-
ment, then
Yi = f(xl, x 2 . Xn) (I)
How can we measure investment in children, and what are some of the other
factors besides care of aged parents influencing investments? Several studies,
beginning with Becker, have examined the investment in children based upon
the number of children in the family (fertility rates).45 Economists have related
the number of children to such factors as parental income, years of educa-
tion, and the divorce rate.46 Another way of measuring investment in children
is to calculate the time spent on their care. Studies have already modeled
time spent on children as a function of their age, income, gender, and the
employment status of each parent.4 7
This paper looks at other measures of investment in children. One other
measure of parental investment is the financial outlays parents make for their
children.4 s A data source measuring this outlay is the payment of agreed upon
or court-ordered child support by noncustodial parents. 49 Another is the invest-
ment by the state in education for children; however, studies reveal that the
amount spent on education is not a successful predictor of child performance
on such tests as the Scholastic Aptitude Test. 50 A closer proxy might be invest-
ment in gifted secondary school students enrolled in college-level courses.
A data source measuring the output of this investment is success on the
Advanced Placement examination. Another data source measuring successful
parenting is the child's performance on standardized tests given to all children
in school systems.5 ' Unfortunately families also experience negative "invest-
45 See, e.g., Becker and Lewis, supra note 24; Gary Becker and Nigel Tomes (1976) Child
Endowments and the Quantity and Quality of Children, J. Pol. Econ. 84: 143.
4 Id.
47 See sources cited at note 38, supra.
4 If expenses on food and housing are examined, it is difficult to separate out money spent
directly on children from that spent on the household in general. This can be compared to the
difficulty in studies looking at parental time allocation, which must filter out time spent in general
household activities. See articles cited in note 38, supra.
49 As Weiss and Willis argue, supra note 38, allocation of these payments cannot be con-
trolled efficiently by the payor spouse. However, the law presumes that they are being spent
to benefit the child. The noncustodial parent may have remedies against the custodial parent if
diversion of the payments is egregious. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Birnbaum, 16 N.Y.2d 212, 212
N.E.2d 37, 264 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1965).
5 See discussion in note 60, infra.
SI The National Education Goals Report, supra note 3, gives a variety of reasons for the
relatively poor performance of American schoolchildren. These include the scarcity of good
teachers, the prevalence of crime, and the pervasiveness of drugs.
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ments," akin to dissipation or wasting of assets.52 The data source measure
that relates directly to children is parental child abuse. Equations measuring
parental investment therefore might take the following forms:
Y3= f(X1 , x2 .. . x.), where Y3 = parental child abuse.53  (2)
Y2 f(x 1 , x 2 ... x.)
where Y2 = performance on standardized testing.54  (3)
Y1 = f(x1 , x 2 . . .x.),
where y, = performance of child support obligations.55  (4)
52 Divorce itself, while it may be beneficial to the adults involved, frequently has a negative
effect upon their children. See, e.g., Barbara Dafoe Whitehead (1993) Dan Quayle was right;
Harmful effects of divorce on children, The Atlantic 271: 47 (April). Whitehead's article reviews
research by such scholars as Judy Wallerstein and Mavis Hetherington, both of whom did lon-
gitudinal research involving the children of divorced parents. See, e.g., Mavis Hetherington,
Martha Cox, and Roger Cox (1982) Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in M.E. Lamb
(ed.) Nontraditional Families: Parenting and Child Development, 233; Mavis Hetherington,
Martha Cox and Roger Cox (1985) Long-Term Effects of Divorce and Remarriage on the
Adjustment of Children, 24 J. Amer. Acad. Child Psych. 24: 518; Judith S. Wallerstein (1989)
Second Chances: Men, Women, and Children A Decade After Divorce; Judith S. Wallerstein
(1980) Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce; Judith S.
Wallerstein (1991) The Long-Term Effects of Divorce on Children: A Review, J. Amer. Acad.
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 30: 349.
Whitehead writes:
If we fail to come to terms with the relationship between family structure and declining
child well-being, then it will be increasingly difficult to improve children's life prospects,
no matter how many new programs the federal government funds. Nor will we be able to
make progress in bettering school performance or reducing crime or improving the quality
of the nation's future work force - all domestic problems closely connected to family breakup.
Worse, we may contribute to the problem by pursuing policies that actually increase family
instability and breakup.
53 My colleague Frank Buckley speculates that child abuse has decreased over time. Although
I have not run these equations as time series, my guess would be the opposite. When children
were valuable economic assets, there would be little incentive to exploit them through physical
or sexual abuse. Compare David Galenson (1986) Traders, Planters and Slaves (no real incen-
tive to exploit slaves since they would not otherwise be valuable in the future). Further, with
the tremendous increase in the divorce rate since World War II, parents "on the margin" of
abuse have less incentive to refrain in order to hold their families together.
54 There are two measures of this investment examined here: the Scholastic Aptitude Test,
and the Advanced Placement examination pass rate. Most college bound secondary school students
in the United states take the S.A.T. Students taking college level courses while in high school
attempt the AP exams.
55 Although a divorce may indicate a breach or recission of the marital contract, the cases
are quite clear that the parent-child relationship continues on, affected as little as possible by
the parents' separation. See, e.g., Conway v. Conway, 10 Va. App. 653, 395 S.E.2d 464 (1990)
(children are entitled to the financial advantages they would have had if the marriage had remained
intact). See also Everett, supra note 13 (the parental covenant continues). Child support is a
complicated phenomenon, since in part any payment made by a noncustodial parent benefits
the custodial (divorced) parent in some way. For a discussion of the monitoring problems involved
with child support, see Weiss and Willis, supra note 37. Because of these complications, it
would not make sense to look only at this equation.
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The section below describes empirical testing of Equations 2 to 4 in both
American and international settings.
4. Is there a contract between parents and children? Empirical results
If it is correct that there used to be an intergenerational contract for support
at the time of dependency, investment in children should be highest where more
elderly people are cared for by their adult children. Conversely, where many
elderly people live alone, their children should not be investing as much in
minor children.
In order to explore these predictions, I collected both national and inter-
national data. I looked for evidence of both positive and negative contributions
by parents. In each case, I used an investment variable as dependent. The
regressions explored whether I could isolate provision for the elderly as an
important contributing factor. 6 The right hand side variables also included
general demographic information that alternatively might explain the depen-
dent variable.
Table 1 shows the results of variation among states in the number of
people over 65 living alone (ALONE65) 7 on the incidence of child abuse
(CABUSE) in the United States during 199 L" The other exogenous (inde-
pendent) variables considered are the percentage of children under 18
(UNDER18), 59 family income (FAMINC), 6 the divorce rate in 1988 (DIV88),
the percentage of married women with husbands present who are in the labor
force (WOMLAB), 61 the percentage of the state population living in rural
areas (NONMETRO), and the state's infant mortality rate (INFMORT).62
16 Because the relationship were, not necessarily linear, all coefficients in the regressions
represent logarithmic values except for the dummy variable for a statutory preference for joint
custody. Econometric analysis for this paper used White, K. J. SHAZAM. A Comprehensive
Computer Program for Regression Models (Version 6), Computational Statistics and Data
Analysis (December, 1988).
" Data for this variable on the state level comes from United States Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census (1992) Sixty Five Plus in America, Current Population Reports P23-178,
Table 6-6, at 6-11 to 6-12.
58 Data for child abuse in the United States came from United States Department of Health
and Human Services, National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System, Working Paper 1, 1990
Summary Data Component 10, Section II - Report Data by Source (1992). Child abuse reporting
rates per 1000 US children can also be found in Table I of the American Humane Association
(1989) Highlights of Official Aggregate Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting (Denver, Colo.).
59 Population data come from United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract: 1992, Table C.
60 Data was taken from the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
(1991) Money Income of Households, Families and Persons in the United States 1991, P-60,
Table 180.
61 This data comes from a computer printout supplied by the United States Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Reference 140, dated February 13, 1989. This data is from 1987.
62 The infant mortality rates were taken from Statistical Abstract, supra note xx, at 81, Table
112.
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Table 1. Child abuse in United States
Variable Estimated Standard T-ratio Partial Standardized Elasticity at
name coefficient error 42 D.F. correlation coefficient means
ALONE65 1.3456 0.69757 1.9290* 0.2853 0.3018 1.9601
FAMINC 0.16189 0.51616 -0.31365 0.0483 0.59168-01 0.72574
UNDER18 -0.54738 0.24360 -2.2470* -0.3276 -1.2464 -3.2410
DIV88 0.52341 0.23694 2.2090* 0.3226 1.1970 0.61437
WOMLAB 0.62291 0.53427 1.1659 0.1771 0.17069 1.0926
NONMETRO -0.16152E-01 0.58374E-01-0.27670 0.0427 -0.4993E-01 -0.22666E-01
INFMORT 0.29614 0.43366 0.68289 0.1048 0.10414 0.29237
CONSTANT -0.96722 7.5100 -0.12879 -0.0199 0.OOOOOE+00 -0.42142
R2 = 0.21 * sig. at 0.05
The dependent variable, child abuse (CABUSE) is the number of reported
incidents during the 12 previous months in each state, divided by the state's
population.
The significant positive relationship between child abuse and the percentage
of elderly people living alone is central to the thesis of this paper. Of course,
grandparents may suppress abuse when they live with their adult children
simply because their presence deters bad behavior.63 This is not inconsistent
with my thesis - the presence of a caring relative who can buffer an abusing
parent's anger is the important thing.
The popular wisdom is that child abuse partly reflects poverty or a parent's
general feelings of powerlessness. This view is not supported by this study,
although the coefficients in question are not significant. Here the estimated
coefficient for income is positive. Similarly, one would expect less not more
abuse as the wife entered the labor force, since the additional income should
alleviate stress in the home. These two results may reflect an increased will-
ingness of educated persons to report abuse. Reporting may also account for
the higher incidence of abuse in metropolitan areas, where there are also
more services for abused family members. The negative (but insignificant)
coefficient would not appear to support Rubin, Kau and Meeter's 64 thesis
that parents need to make time-intensive investments to control their children's
behavior in places where capital is primarily human capital. Since children
often take the brunt of their parent's anger in unhappy marriages,65 you could
" The analogy is to people flashing their headlights at oncoming traffic to signal radar traps.
If the goal is to cause traffic to slow down, rather than to increase the public treasury, it will
be achieved irregardless of the signaling.
64 supra note 9.
65 See National Commission, supra note 4, at xxx. See also Whitehead, supra note 51, at 59:
One of the worst consequences of these divided interests is a withdrawal of parental invest-
ment in children's well-being. As the Stanford economist Victor Fuchs has pointed out, the
main source of social investment in children is private. The investment comes from the
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predict the significant positive correlation with the divorce rate. Further, parents
who think they are not going to be living with their families for much longer
might be inclined to invest less in them.66
In contrast to the "negative investment" shown in Table I and Table 2
demonstrates how a larger percentage of senior citizens supported by (or at
least living with) their families may have a positive effect on the investment
in children. This time I measured contribution by the percentage of students
passing Advanced Placement Examinations, again by state. Right hand
side variables in addition to ALONE65 include the percentage of the popu-
lation finishing high school (FINISH),67 the size of the population under 18
(UNDER18), the median family income (FAMINC), the percentage of women
in the labor force (WOMLAB) and the percentage of people living in non-
metropolitan areas (NONMETRO).68
Table 2. Percentage passing AP EXAM
Variable Estimated Standard T-ratio Partial Standardized Elasticity at
name coefficient error 42 D.F. correlation coefficient means
ALONE65 -3.94 1.3454 -2.9305* -0.4041 -0.38875 -2.5237
FINISH 0.87009 0.83552 1.0414 0.1551 0.14064 1.6830
UNDER18 0.77676E-06 0.24003E-05 0.32361 0.0487 0.43138E-01 0.22165E-01
FAMINC 0.70883E-03 0.82449E-03 0.85972 0.1285 0.13577 0.47498
NONMETRO -0.43707 0.18204 -2.4010* -0.3403 -0.38483 -0.35361
CONSTANT 75.386 65.722 1.1470 0.1704 0000.00 1.697
R2 = 0.52; * sig. at 0.05.
The variable ALONE65 was significantly and negatively related to the
percentage of students passing the Advanced Placement examination. Parents
who do not have close connections with their own parents shows less concern
for the child's education, whether through emphasis at home or less directly
children's parents. But parents in disrupted families have less time, attention, and money to
devote to their children. The single most important source of disinvestment has been the wide-
spread withdrawal of financial support and involvement by fathers. Maternal investment,
too, has declined, as women try to raise families on their own and work outside the home.
Moreover, both mothers and fathers commonly respond to family breakup by investing
more heavily in themselves and in their own personal and romantic lives.
Id. at 59.
' See Weiss & Willis, supra note 37. There may be somewhat of a simultaneity problem
here. Divorce may cause abuse, while at the same time abuse may cause divorce. Abuse of a
child is an independent cause of action for divorce in at least one state and would probably support
a cruelty-based divorce in others. W. Va. Code §48-2-4(9) (1992).
67 This data comes from Statistical Abstracts, supra note 59.
6 A two-stage least squares analysis, with ALONE65 as the dependent variable in one equation,
did not produce significant results for a relationship with NONMETRO and MEDINC.
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through support of advanced secondary school programs. The only other sig-
nificant variable in this equation was the non metropolitan population, again
with a negative result. This time, however, the results support the Rubin,
Kau and Meeker thesis. 69 It may be that farm parents are not as interested in
college level work, or that the rural high schools are too small to have good
preparation for the examination. As one would expect, although not signifi-
cant, the sign is positive for median income and the percentage completing
high school.
A third table (Table 3) also shows the negative side of the intergenera-
tional contract. In this case, I tested whether the number of persons over 65
living alone (ALONE65) would have an important effect on the percentage
of noncustodial parents meeting child support obligations.7° Other variables
include family median income (FAMINC), the percent of children under 18
(UNDER18), the percentage of women in the labor force (WOMLAB), the
divorce rate for 1988 (DIV88), a dummy variable for state statutes presuming
joint custody (JTCUSTODY),71 the percentage living in non-metropolitan areas
(NONMETRO), and the infant mortality rate (INFMORT).
Table 3. Child support percentage collected, US
Variable Estimated Standard T-ratio Partial Standardized Elasticity at
name coefficient error 42 D.F. correlation coefficient means
ALONE65 -1.8854 0.97047 -1.9428* -0.3161 -0.34051 -1.6318
INCOME 0.24030 0.41907 0.57342 0.0979 0.11208 0.63726
UNDER18 0.54712 0.19910 2.7480* 0.4263 1.5898 1.9170
WOMLAB 0.60900 0.41251 1.4763 0.2454 0.22041 0.63120
DIV88 -0.45216 0.19381 -2.3331* -0.3715 -1.2963 -0.31414
JTCUSTODY 0.57931E-010.11229 0.51589 0.0881 0.78910E-01 0.10079E-01
NONMETRO 0.45482E-01 0.47636E-01 0.95477 0.1616 0.18431 0.38386E-01
INF. MORT 0.38466 0.37370 1.0293 0.1738 0.16629 0.22555
CONSTANT -1.9905 7.1084 -0.28002 -0.0480 0.OOOOOE+00 -0.51349
R2 = 0.34 * sig. at 0.05
My analysis predicts that the parents who have their parents living with
them will be more motivated to meet obligations involving children, such as
child support. In fact, this appears to be the case, and the negative value on
ALONE65 is significant. Perhaps the collection mechanism improves as the
9 Supra note 9.
70 Data on child support enforcement comes from United States Department of Health and
Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Child Support Enforcement,
Child Support Enforcement (1990) Fifteenth Annual Report to Congress 138, Table 97. Again,
all data is by state for the United States.
71 State statutes come from Timothy B. Walker and Linda H. Elrod (1993) Family Law in
the Fifty States: An Overview, Fan. L.Q. 26: 319, 378 and Table 9.
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number of children under 18 increases. This would explain the positive and
significant coefficient for UNDER18, but seems to contradict the negative
and significant coefficient for the divorce rate. Other values were not signifi-
cant, but had the sign one would expect.
Of course it was entirely possible for these results to hold true only for
the United States because of some other conditions present in this country. I
therefore collected similar data from various Western and non-Western
economies. Because child support enforcement regimes varied considerably
between countries,72 I did not obtain this data. However, Tables 4 and 5 present
testing results (for Mathematics and Science) on an international level, with
independent variables much like those in Tables 2 and 3.73
The international results are close to what one would predict using the
present analysis. The coefficient on per capita income is significant in only
one equation (and is negative in both), the infant mortality rate is negative
and significant in both equations. Infant mortality is another indication of
the country's level of development. It is possible that this coefficient indi-
Table 4. International math results
Variable Estimated Standard T-ratio Partial Standardized Elasticity at
name coefficient error 42 D.F. correlation coefficient means
ALONE65 -0.74861E-01 0.36575E-01 -2.0468* -0.5434 -0.52507 -0.45302E-01
POPOVER65 0.30329E-01 0.15373 0.19729 0.0623 0.67515E-01 0.16785E.01
INCOME -0.15029 0.63602E-01 -2.3630* -0.5986 -0.88410 -0.32506
URBAN 0.20994 0.17700 1.1861 0.3512 0.29321 0.21423
INFMORT -0.35054 0.11490 -3.0509* -0.6943 -1.1683 -0.21162
CONSTANT 5.5728 1.0158 5.4859 0.08664 0.0000E+00 1.3510
R2 = 0.59; * sig. at 0.05.
72 Australia, for example, requires employers to withhold child support payments automati-
cally as they do income taxes. Other countries require some action by the custodial spouse to
trigger enforcement. In contrast, the enforcement mechanism in the United States is mandated
by the Social Security Act and is therefore uniform. Compliance in the United States will there-
fore vary between states for other reasons than the mechanism for collection.
73 Data for population (POP) and income (INCOME) come from the World Bank (1991)
World Development Report 1991, The Challenge of Development, Table 1, 204-205 (Oxford
Univ. Press). Data on Urbanization (URBAN) is found id. at Table 31, 264-265; while data
on population under 14 (POP14), since under 18 population is not measured, is found id. at
Table 26, 254-255. Data on infant mortality (INFMORT) appears id. at Table 28, 258-229.
Data for population over 65 (POPOVER65) and Population living alone come from the United
States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census Center for International Research (1990)
Living with the Elderly: A Cross-National Perspective, Table I and are largely for 1990. Results
on the Mathematics Test come from Educational Testing Service (1992) International Assessment
of Educational Progress, Learning Mathematics, Figure 1.1 at 18. The samples are small because
the mathematics test sample was only for 20 countries.
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Table 5. International math results 4
Variable Estimated Standard T-ratio Partial Standardized Elasticity at
name coefficient error 42 D.F. correlation coefficient means
ALONE65 -0.33827E-02 0.18540E-01 -1.8246* -0.4998 -0.49280 -0.19973E-01
POP -0.78872E-02 0.16365E-01 -0.48196 -0.1507 -0.13670 -0.19634E-01
INCOME -0.30925E-01 0.34192E-01 -0.90446 -0.2750 -0.37786 -0.65264E-01
URBAN 0.87304E-01 0.92494E-01 0.94388 0.2860 0.25326 0.86925E-01
INFMORT -0.13161 0.57602E-01 -2.2848* -0.5857 -0.91108 -0.77524E-01
CONSTANT 4.6314 0.45022 10.287 0.9559 0.00000E+00 1.0955
R2 = 0.48; * sig. at 0.05.
cates a greater regard for children as more of them survive infancy.75 Population
is not significantly related to performance on the examination. Otherwise the
positive and negative investment regressions are nearly identical.
Finally, Table 6 looks again at the problem of child abuse, this time on
an international sample of 20 countries.76 Independent variables, excluding
"ALONE65", include the population under 14 (POP14), per capita income
(FAMINC), percent living in urban areas (URBAN), and the infant mortality
rate (INFMORT).
Robust analysis produced interesting results for the international child abuse
equation. As predicted, the number of elderly living alone is significantly
related to the incidence of abuse. In fact it is the most significant indicator
other than population. As with the domestic data, the positive sign on the
relevant population variable is difficult to explain. As with the United States,
there is a negative relationship with non-urban areas. This time there is a
positive but insignificant relationship with income. Child abuse is negatively
and significantly related to the infant mortality rate. This suggests that the
parents value children less if they are unsure they'll survive to adulthood.
"' Statistics on the Science test come from Educational Testing Service (1992) International
Assessment of Educational Progress, Learning Science, 18, Figure 1.1. Countries involved in this
study include Korea, Taiwan, Switzerland, Hungary, Russia, Slovenia, Italy, Israel, Canada,
France, Scotland, Spain, United States, Ireland, Jordan, England, China, Portugal, and Brazil.
Although I would have preferred a study involving only industrialized countries, I attempted
to control for any inaccurate results by using the variable INFMORT, since infant mortality is
generally associated with less developed nations.
" See Aries, supra note 22, and Demos, supra note 10, at 71 (children occasionally "put out")
to live in other homes and learn trades.
71 Information on Child Sexual Abuse comes from David Finkelhor, International Epidemiology
of Child Sexual Abuse, Family Research Laboratory and Department of Sociology, University
of New Hampshire, 12 and Table 2. His data is explained in Appendix I at 13. Again, the
sample size limitation comes from Finkelhor's small sample size. Finkelhor also failed to include
data for oriental countries. This data has been requested from another source. The countries
included Austria, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, England, France, Germany, Hungary,




Table 6. International child abuse
Variable Estimated Standard T-ratio Partial Standardized Elasticity at
name coefficient error 42 D.F. correlation coefficient means
ALONE65 0.17183 0.33765E-01 5.0890* 0.8160 0.35615 1.57162
POP14 0.44977 0.68943E-01 6.5238* 0.8752 0.70892 1.2112
FAMINC 0.40644R-01 0.37354E-01 1.0881 0.2889 -0.67857E-01 -0.61140E-01
URBAN -0.69264E-01 0.14313E-01 -4.8392 -0.8019 -0.28229 -0.57788
INFMORT -0.59807E-01 0.26242E-01 -2.2791* -0.5343 -0.23597 -0.10316
CONSTANT -0.87129 2.1896 0.39792 -0.1097 0.0000 -0.10346
* sig. at 0.05.
Conclusion
There are at least two possible explanations for the observed relationship
between treatment of the elderly and treatment of children. One possibility
is the economic one: parents who expect to be supported by their children
in their declining years are likely to make greater investments in them. The
other is that some cultures more than others revere elderly family members.
Data within the United States tend to support this second possibility to the
extent that American culture is heterogeneous. A better test would be to
examine very similar countries that differ only in the elderly living alone
variable. For example, if one could examine data from North and South Korea,
Croatia and Slovenia, and West and East Germany, in a series of pairwise com-
parisons, there could be interesting observations.
Of course, both explanations are related. If the culture supports reverence
for the aged ancestor for a non-economic reason such as religion, the economic
result may hold true as well: the elderly citizen will be supported his adult
children.77 A deeper regard for all family members will increase benefits for
both the children and the elderly.78 One would expect the investment in children
that is reflected in the analysis above.
There are therefore two recommendations, besides a suggestion for further
study, that might be made. One assumes that the economic motivation is
dominant: if public provision for the elderly results in less investment in
children, some thought might be given to discontinuing or limiting public
17 For recent comments on Japan, suggesting that more and more older persons become depen-
dent members of younger households, see Fumio Hayashi (1986) Why is Japan's Saving Rate
So Apparently High?, in National Bureau of Economic Research, Macroeconomics Annual,
147, 176 (Stanley Fischer, ed.) (67 percent of persons 65 or over lived with their children in
1983).
18 Although it is possible that to some extent the Catholic Church is trying to diversify support
for its pro-life stand, the encyclical Humanae Vita clearly ties care for children (including the
unborn) to care for the elderly and terminally ill.
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support.79 The other assumes that the cultural motivation dominates, although
the economic effect might follow.80 Under this alternative view, the Western
nations, which are the ones with the least significant connection between adults
and their parents, might try to strengthen these ties. The beginning could be
made by heavy investments of time and money in our own children,8' or by
providing the example in offering homes for our elderly parents. Finally, to
some extent, strengthening connections, especially for fathers,82 may require
a change in emphasis in legal interpretation.
3
79 Gary Becker makes this argument in his Nobel address, supra note 18, at 24, when he
states that "parents who do not need support when they become old do not try as hard to make
children more loyal, guiltier, or otherwise feel as well-disposed toward their parents. This
means that programs like social security that significantly help the elderly would encourage family
members to drift apart emotionally, not by accident but as maximizing responses to those
policies." See also Burnheim, Shleifer and Summers, supra note 18, at 1074 (general decline
in attentiveness of adult children to parents since introduction of Social Security); see also Richard
Epstein, supra note 14, at 1466:
[Tihe natural parental investment in their children creates a bias for the protection of their
future that legal and social institutions should exploit, not undermine. Taxing and regula-
tory policies designed to secure equality of wealth in the next generation do so at the cost
of reducing the levels of capital accumulation.
Epstein says the basis for the link is genetic, id. at 1472, and that transmission is largely
through bequests, id. at 1475.
As Lloyd Cohen points out, any abolition of pensions and other old age benefits may have
an unfortunate effect that goes beyond hardship to a current generation left without financial
support. Without the cultural or community motivation, there might still be little investment in
children but only a greater investment in one's own human capital by the middle generation.
The expectation under this alternative would be that one must provide for one's own old age.
'o See Mary Ann Glendon (1991) Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse,
126 (noting the economic argument, but adopting a communitarian approach).
s Victor Fuchs and Diane M. Reklis (1992) America's Children: Economic Perspectives and
Policy Options, Science 255: 41, 44, state that this cannot be compelled, but might be induced
through a "well-chosen combination of taxes on adult consumption and subsidies of children's
goods and services." Sociologist Peter Laslett suggests that an intergenerational tricontract
connects succeeding generations, in which each cohort of children can claim support from
parent cohorts as a matter of right, and creates corresponding duties to future generations. Peter
Laslett (1992) Is There a Generational Contract?, in Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin (eds.)
Justice Between Age Groups and Generations, 24.
Any value change to be followed later by a desired economic result would require a real
educational effort. Such attitudinal change can be achieved, of course, as we have seen with
modem campaigns against smoking and in favor of a lower amount of fat in diets.
82 Whitehead, supra note 51, at 57, writes that "fatherhood has declined as a norm for men.
In 1976 less than half as many fathers as in 1957 said that providing for children was a life
goal. The proportion of working men who found marriage and children burdensome and restric-
tive more than doubled in the same period. Fewer than half of all adult Americans today regard
the idea of sacrifice for others as a positive moral virtue."
93 Barbara Woodhouse explains that laws defining "fathering as little more than procreation
plus formal recognition and occasional contact with the child may mask the importance to
family systems of both cross-generational and intergenerational support and functional inter-
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What I have discussed here portrays a rather static view of the world,
rather than one adapting and changing over time to meet societal needs.84
For example, in the nineteen thirties, when the United States enacted Social
Security laws, the country was in the midst of a deep economic depression.
Income security for the elderly, the disabled, and dependents was naturally a
most important national goal. Since the legislation protected many children's
interests, Congress gave little thought to the "dark side": that in future years
Social Security (and later, private pension plans) might cleave the tissue of
the family itself. Perhaps only now, as the country reassesses the wisdom of
social insurance for fiscal reasons, is it important to look at its unintended con-
sequences. s5
dependence." Barbara Bennett Woodhouse (1993) Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, Cardozo L. Rev. 14: 1747. See also Schneider, supra note 17,
at 526-529, noting how what he calls law's "channeling function" can strengthen the institu-
tions of marriage and parenthood.
I This is somewhat ironic, for I have recently criticized feminists for making the same mistake
as they castigate Victorian women who chose the separate sphere of their household to market
production. Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, Corn. L. Rev. 79: -, nn. 27-50
(forthcoming 1994).
85 Compare Margaret F. Brinig and Steven M. Crafton, Opportunism in Marriage, J. Legal Stud.
23: 869 (forthcoming, 1994).

